Breno Altman is a Brazilian journalist, political analyst, and founder of “Opera Mundi,” a media platform focused on international affairs from a left perspective. In this conversation, he analyzes the global and regional implications of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the diversity and potential within BRICS, and the shifting landscape of Latin American politics. Altman also reflects on the challenges and possibilities for rekindling the spirit of continental integration that once animated the region under Hugo Chávez’s leadership.
We are entering a second Trump administration. Recently, in your program “Opera Mundi,” you provided a synthesis of what the Democratic and Republican parties represent today. Both are, of course, imperialist, but they represent different factions of the bourgeoisie. From a Latin American perspective, what can we expect from this second Trump term?
Donald Trump essentially represents factions of the US bourgeoisie that lost profitability with so-called “globalization” – that is, with the opening of the US domestic market in exchange for free access to other countries’ markets. In order to recover revenues and profits, these sectors seek to close their country’s market again, protect their businesses from international competition, or obtain better conditions in the international flow of goods and capital. Mainly for this reason, Donald Trump’s program is protectionist, promising, and already implementing significant increases in import tariffs. This perspective considerably affects Latin American economies that still see the US as a relevant market, particularly those that export industrial products.
Furthermore, due to its nationalist-chauvinist nature, the Trump administration is working to restructure the imperialist system. Since World War II, the United States has sought to keep various imperialist states and their peripheries united and integrated, even at the cost of concessions and agreements. The priority was to keep the system united, protecting it from past inter-imperialist conflicts – first to counter the socialist bloc and later to preserve American hegemony over the planet.
The current administration has expressed its intention to abandon the imperialist system as a priority, reinforcing the specific imperialist interests of the United States, even if this leads to conflicts within the G7. The Trump government shows signs of wanting to reduce intervention areas, particularly by stepping away from Europe and focusing on both polarization against China and controlling the Middle East, while reasserting hegemony in the Americas.
The trend, therefore, is for Trump to strongly revive the 1823 “America for the Americans” Monroe Doctrine. The attacks against Canada and Mexico are likely just a prelude to what is yet to come.
About six months ago, Venezuela, with its directly anti-imperialist stance, appeared somewhat isolated in Latin America. Even President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil and President Gustavo Petro of Colombia attempted to carve out a sort of “third way” in their relations with the US. However, recent events have exposed the limits of that approach. In light of this, do you think Lula and Petro will shift toward a more anti-imperialist position, or at least one that prioritizes sovereignty over the relationship with the continental hegemon?
I think that is a possibility. If Kamala Harris had won, there would probably have been a broad continental alliance to isolate Venezuela, even dragging Colombia and Brazil into it. With Trump, this becomes impractical. Even if progressive governments wish to avoid conflicts with the White House, the fact is that Trump will make these conflicts inevitable because he aims to reclaim hegemony in Latin America.
In this scenario, the tendency for a stronger anti-imperialist response from Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil could gain momentum, driven even by the internal political survival of their leaders. On that basis, there could be a revival of regional integration, along with a gradual recovery of strategic relations, for example, between Brazil and Venezuela.
From a Global South perspective, how do you assess the role of BRICS in the struggle for a multipolar world? Further, how do you interpret Brazil’s decision to veto Venezuela’s entry into the bloc at the Kazan Summit in October 2024? Do you think this stance could change at the upcoming summit in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025?
In my opinion, the main contradiction in the world today lies between the US-led imperialist system and a broad emerging anti-imperialist front, whose essential goal is to overcome the unipolar order established after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In this context, BRICS is the most significant economic and financial framework for a counter-hegemonic strategy, as it seeks to develop an alternative to the dominance of the US dollar and the monetary institutions controlled by central capitalist countries. Since it is not a bloc with military or even direct geopolitical ambitions and avoids imposing political or economic models, it has enough flexibility to even attract nations that are still under US influence.
Regarding Brazil’s veto of Venezuela’s entry into BRICS – which I consider a serious mistake by the Lula government – I believe its reasoning lies in three main areas. First, the desire to punish the Maduro government for not adhering to the stance Brazil defended during Venezuela’s presidential elections. Second, to demonstrate to the liberal West, especially Europe and the United States, that Brazil is not unconditionally aligned with the China- and Russia-led bloc. Third, to attempt to neutralize, within Brazilian territory, the offensive of conservative forces that have made the Bolivarian Revolution a permanent target.
Finally, I do not think it will be easy to revert this scenario before the July summit, although relations between the two governments have already overcome their most tense phase. The Lula government will likely only lift the veto if there is significant pressure from Brazil’s left-wing parties and popular movements.
Hugo Chávez, Néstor Kirchner and Lula da Silva, on January 19, 2006 in Brasilia. (Archives)
The first decade of the 21st century was marked by a strong push for continental integration, with Hugo Chávez’s Bolivarian vision having a major influence on Latin America and the Caribbean. It resonated with leaders and people around the continent. Do you think that spirit of unity, so powerful at that time, can be rekindled today?
Never before has Latin American unity been so urgent and necessary. The Trump administration makes regional integration even more imperative. However, the obstacles are significant. On the one hand, there are far-right governments, such as Javier Milei’s in Argentina. On the other, there are progressive governments that hesitate to embrace an anti-imperialist stance, as seen in Chile, Colombia, and Brazil.
To rebuild the path proposed by Chávez and Lula at the beginning of the century, it is essential to first restore the strategic alliance between Venezuela and Brazil, as this is the fundamental driving force behind regional unity. Hopefully, this will happen in the coming months.
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Publish date : 2025-02-14 03:59:00
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