Why Sebastián Piñera Would Struggle to Govern in Chile

Chilean President Michelle Bachelet at a polling station in Santiago, November 2017.

Ximena Navarro / Courtesy of Chilean Presidency / Handout via Reuters VICTORY BY DEFAULT

All these changes—cultural liberalization, the politicization of inequality, and declining public trust in the business community—are bad news for Chile’s right. So why did Piñera win the first round, and why is he on track to win on Sunday?

There are a few pieces to the puzzle. The first is the unpopularity of Bachelet’s government: according to polls, in August, only 19 percent of Chileans approved of its performance. Bachelet’s poor ratings are due partly to Chile’s economic slowdown, which is itself a product of a decline in the price of copper—the country’s biggest export—between 2011 and 2015. But they are also the result of an influence-peddling scandal involving the president’s son and daughter-in-law that broke in early 2015. The controversy irreparably damaged Bachelet’s credibility.

In her first year in government, Bachelet was still popular, and she managed to rally a number of competing forces—such as the Communist, Christian Democratic, and Social Democratic Radical Parties—behind her administration. But as her popularity declined in 2015 and 2016, some who previously backed her governing coalition began to distance themselves from it. This was particularly the case among key members of the Christian Democratic Party, who demanded that Bachelet slow down her reforms in areas from education and labor relations to tax policy. By bowing to the pressure, Bachelet alienated others on the left, who grew increasingly critical of her government and, in 2016, decided to form a new political grouping called the Broad Front—a coalition of left-wing forces linked to social movements, such as the 2011 student protests. (Beatriz Sánchez, the Broad Front’s presidential candidate, took 20 percent of the votes in the election’s first round; she seems set to become a major political figure in the years ahead.)

Whereas centrists worried about the poor design of Bachelet’s reforms and her government’s apparent radicalism, leftists were disillusioned by her concessions to the center. Bachelet’s government thus disappointed two constituencies that initially sympathized with her agenda. Chile’s left-wing forces fragmented, running different candidates for the presidency and legislature. Six of the eight presidential candidates in the election’s first round were left of center.

But there is more behind the right’s likely victory than the problems of the left. Another factor is crucial: declining voter turnout. In 1989, when Chile returned to democratic rule, 86 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot. In November, only 46 percent of them did. Research by the UNDP’s Chilean bureau has shown that the decline in turnout is particularly steep among the poor, who have historically been a reliable source of left-wing votes.

Piñera has taken advantage of this dynamic by focusing more on mobilizing partisans than on winning the votes of independents. That strategy will pay off in electoral terms, but the downside will be a narrow base of support. In the first round of the presidential election in 2009, Piñera won three million votes. In November, he won 2.5 million. An important segment of the electorate defines its political identity in opposition to right-wing parties. If Piñera wins on Sunday, it will be a victory by default.

CHANGING TERRITORY

There is some good news for the right: the price of copper has risen since the end of 2015, and Piñera is an experienced businessman with a team of skillful technocrats behind him. If elected, he should be able to keep Chile’s economy growing.

Still, he will struggle to govern. Chile’s presidential system will give him enough power to initiate some changes, but without a majority in either chamber of the legislature, he won’t be able to push through major reforms. He will have to make concessions to left-of-center groups, mainly the Christian Democrats, on issues such as the expansion of free postsecondary education and the reform of the private pension system. That won’t be easy: the more radical right-wing members of his coalition will resist compromise.

Then there is the fact that power in today’s Chile depends not only on the legislature but also on the street. Citizens have become less satisfied with democracy and are turning to protest to express their discontent, and social movements have politicized the anger of large segments of the electorate over the country’s economic disparities. Demonstrators tend to have strained relationships with their governments. That would be especially the case under Piñera, given his strong ties to business and conservative groups. In the years ahead, Chile will probably see massive protests demanding educational reforms and an end to the country’s private pension system. Dealing with those demands would be hard for Piñera.

Pollsters failed to predict the outcome of the election’s first round, and it is possible that Guillier will win on Sunday. He, too, would have a hard time governing. Despite his social democratic rhetoric, Guillier is an independent, and his relations with both the Broad Front and more established left-of-center parties are strained. He is also inexperienced, having worked as a journalist for more than three decades before entering politics in 2013. Like Piñera, he would have to deal with a citizenry angry with its establishment and hungry for egalitarian reform. Regardless of who becomes the next president, the real winners in the years ahead will be those who adjust to the changing territory of Chile’s popular politics.

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Source link : https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2017-12-13/bitter-victory-chilean-right

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Publish date : 2017-12-13 03:00:00

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