How America’s allies and adversaries view Trump’s possible return

[ad_1]

NEW YORK CITY — The annual United Nations General Assembly high-level week is underway. The bane of city residents and a great boon for city hotels, this week sees tens of thousands of foreign leaders, diplomats, journalists, and others flood into Manhattan. The traffic is terrible, the Diplomatic Security Service and U.S. Secret Service security details are stretched near breaking point, and the FBI and CIA quietly attempt to recruit new spies and debrief old ones.

Still, while Middle East conflicts, the war in Ukraine, U.S.-China tensions, and dozens of other global concerns are at the top of the formal agendas, one topic looms large below the surface of nearly every conversation: what former President Donald Trump‘s return to the Oval Office might mean for each country and for the world.

Very few foreign diplomats are willing to speak on the record about Trump’s possible restoration as president. Sensitive to Trump’s obsession with respect and deference, they fear attracting Trump’s ire and the possibility of future policy retaliation. Offered national and personal anonymity, however, these diplomats are sometimes willing to speak a little more freely here in New York City, and in Washington, D.C. What are the takeaways from these conversations?

First up, the very mention of Trump’s name tends to bring about varying degrees of dread. Whatever Republicans and Americans more generally might feel about the former president, there is no question that Trump is manifestly unpopular with most foreign governments. There are exceptions here including true allies such as Israel, El Salvador, and Japan, fake allies such as Hungary, and adversaries such as Russia and North Korea. But the general sense is that Trump is willfully ignorant, terribly unpredictable and far more interested in what benefits him personally than what benefits America and its allies. Trump’s pledge to introduce tariffs on all foreign goods, regardless of their type or source, offers a marked example here.

Diplomats from American allies most lament Trump’s unpredictability and his willingness to make dramatic policy changes on a dime. One U.S. official told the Washington Examiner that foreign diplomats “regularly ask what might change and what will stay the same” if Trump returns.

Of particular concern among European allies is Trump’s perceived vulnerability to manipulation by Vladimir Putin. As Russia continues to wage war on Ukraine and maintain a vast remilitarization program that will eventually threaten eastern flank European Union and NATO states, European allies fear that Trump might cut a deal with Putin that throws their security onto the pyre. It is interesting, however, to see how different European allies respond to the obvious follow-on question as to what they are doing to mitigate this risk. When I’ve made the point that Trump’s preeminent and oft-stated concern with European allies centers on inadequate defense spending, the response is varied.

Some diplomats from states in eastern Europe, for example, leap into rhetorical action at the very mention of defense spending. They proudly note that their defense budgets now exceed 2% of GDP, in some cases such as with Poland very significantly. These diplomats or military attaches also emphasize that they value their U.S. relationship deeply, taking stances on China-related concerns that carry significant costs for their own economies and intra-EU relations but show solidarity with Washington. It also becomes clear that these allies will attempt to replicate Putin’s ego-wooing of Trump with similar gambits. Expect offers of military parades in Trump’s honor or military bases named after the president if he returns to office.

Yet the real fear of these allies is that even meeting Trump’s defense spending expectations and supporting Trump’s global foreign policy agenda might not be enough to consolidate their security.

This concern underlines why European allies are boosting their cooperation with one another. This cooperation, especially in defense and intelligence areas, is designed to provide a backup means of deterrence against Russian intimidation and aggression in the event that Trump refuses to come to their aid in a crisis. Other allies such as France and the United Kingdom support this effort as a way both of better securing Europe but also signaling to Trump that they are responding to his demand that Europe do more for its own security.

President Emmanuel Macron, who has spent most of the Biden administration broadcasting his disdain for Trump and interest in forging a closer partnership with China, offers a notable example here. Macron recognizes that tensions with the U.S. over China policy and other issues such as technology sector regulation are almost certain to grow in a second Trump administration. But Macron’s increases in defense spending and support for Ukraine are also at least partly designed to provide an off-ramp for these tensions. In essence, Macron is giving himself means of telling Trump that France is doing exactly what Trump wants Europe to do: more for its own security.

Germany appears to have decided upon a very different strategy. It seems resigned to the notion that Trump’s return will lead to a major crisis in relations. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has doubled down on close ties with China, pared back defense spending and cut military aid to Ukraine. And responding to Trump’s criticism of Germany’s soaring energy costs, the German foreign ministry recently posted a thinly veiled jibe at the former president.

How about America’s closest ally, the U.K.?

While London favors Vice President Kamala Harris’s election, U.K. diplomats feel they have a good foundation via which to maintain a strong relations with the U.S. if Trump reenters office. The British ambassador, Dame Karen Pierce, has worked hard to forge a good relationship with Trump, which enables them to speak freely without ensuing media leaks. The challenge for the U.K. is whether new prime minister Keir Starmer’s Labour government can balance its outreach to China with the better health of the special relationship. The U.K. will also be concerned over Trump’s attention to Starmer’s abandoning of his predecessor’s pledge to spend at least 2.5% of GDP on defense. Starmer has only committed to spend more than 2% at present and 2.5% when “economic conditions allow.”

Other allies feel more confident in a second Trump term being positive for their fortunes. Japan forged a highly successful relationship with Trump under former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Trump has repeatedly heaped praise upon Abe, who was assassinated in July 2022. But as with Europe’s concern over Trump and Putin, Japan will fear that Trump may attempt a misguided reset with Xi Jinping at its expense. Trump’s unpredictability is the enduring concern here.

What of America’s adversaries?

Russia is playing a quiet hand at the U.N. General Assembly, aware of the broad disdain with which it is held as a result of the war in Ukraine. China is also avoiding keystone public events. And Iran, which has been plotting to assassinate Trump and other former U.S. officials, is also keeping a low profile. Some of this is by necessity: The State Department has restricted the freedom of movement by President Masoud Pezeshkian and his delegation. But Iran is also sidelining journalists with which it previously engaged in apparent fear of drawing attention to its assassination plots controversy.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

Trump might well lose in November. But if he wins, expect many of the very same leaders and diplomats now attending the General Assembly to seek audiences at Trump Tower immediately. They’ll want to know what Trump is planning and what surprises may lay in store. And all of them will want to get on the good side of his ego, fast.

That said, for the vast majority of foreign governments, it’s definitely fingers crossed for Harris.

[ad_1]

Source link : http://www.bing.com/news/apiclick.aspx?ref=FexRss&aid=&tid=66f6c6c9288d4efea9abf6edc54d52d2&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.washingtonexaminer.com%2Fin_focus%2F3166390%2Fhow-americas-allies-and-adversaries-view-trumps-possible-return%2F&c=4886066300643727763&mkt=en-us Author : Publish date : 2024-09-26 11:00:00 Copyright for syndicated content belongs to the linked Source .