One year ago, Venezuela held a referendum to reaffirm its territorial claims on Guyana’s Essequibo region. That ballot ended up being a preview of the country’s stolen presidential election in July of this year. The turnout was so low that the electoral authorities lied about the results and never released the full vote tallies. While authorities claimed that 10 million votes were cast, independent analysts believe the number was fewer than 2 million, given the empty polling sites.
Immediately following the referendum in December 2023, President Nicolas Maduro began what many portrayed at the time as a march to war with Guyana. Venezuelan authorities changed the official map of the country to include Essequibo and threatened to prosecute any Venezuelans who used the old map. The Venezuelan government took a much more hostile tone toward its neighbor, insinuating at times that it would be willing to take Essequibo by force. To underscore the threat, the Venezuelan military engaged in exercises simulating an invasion along the border, built up border infrastructure and facilities, conducted naval patrols in the river that serves as a border, and moved Iranian-made missile boats closer to Guyana’s Atlantic coast.
In response, Brazil deployed military personnel and equipment to its border with Venezuela, where the only road into the Essequibo region runs. The U.S. began sending diplomatic and military officials on regular visits to Guyana and at one point even moved an aircraft carrier close by and flew fighter jets over the country, all to reinforce Washington’s partnership with Georgetown and make it clear to the Maduro regime that an invasion would not be tolerated. The Caribbean Community, or Caricom, and other regional organizations all issued statements backing Guyana’s territorial integrity and attempting to push back against the Venezuelan aggression.
At the time of the referendum and amid Venezuela’s mounting saber-rattling campaign last December, I explained why Venezuela was unlikely to invade Guyana and why, if it did, it would be an enormous mistake that would likely lead to the Maduro regime’s downfall. Venezuela lacked then and still lacks now the diplomatic and military capabilities to successfully invade Guyana and hold territory there. The Maduro regime can’t afford the international pressure that would come with an illegitimate invasion: Guyana’s allies don’t just include Brazil and the U.S.; they also include China and Cuba, two countries that regularly side with Caracas on other issues. Venezuela’s military is also so degraded that it does not have the equipment or personnel to secure much of rural Venezuela—leaving that job to illegal armed groups such as Colombia’s ELN and the Pranes prison gangs—much less territory outside the country’s borders.
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The same kind of fraud seen in the December 2023 referendum on Essequibo would occur again in the July 2024 presidential election. Maduro lost to opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez by approximately 40 percentage points, but the electoral authorities declared Maduro the winner anyway. While the government once again never released the voting tallies, this time the opposition collected enough of them to independently verify Gonzalez’s overwhelming victory.
Maduro’s regime is on much shakier ground today than it was a year ago. He could see lashing out at a foreign enemy as a way to regain legitimacy and distract from domestic problems.
In the immediate aftermath of the fraudulent presidential election, Maduro and Venezuela’s military turned their attention inward to focus on the repression of protests by political opponents. Outside of a few brief diplomatic comments, there’s been barely a peep out of Caracas about its territorial claim on Essequibo, much less an invasion, in the past four months. For now, then, the war that was hyped relentlessly across so many media outlets has never come close to occurring.
Was that inevitable? There is a case to be made that Venezuela was never going to invade and that the threats to do so were all empty rhetoric from Maduro to try to rally the nation around the flag in an election year. There is also an argument that the strong statements from countries across the region and the red line set by the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden made the critical difference in dissuading Maduro from launching an invasion, as reckless and counterproductive as it would have been.
The question matters because three things will change in the coming year that may put a Venezuelan military campaign back on the regional agenda.
First, Maduro is under greater pressure after his presidential election loss. Most dictators maintain political power by creating the illusion of democratic legitimacy, even if it means rigging elections to guarantee victory. Demonstrating big wins, even when everyone knows the rules aren’t fair and the results are falsified, is part of how dictators like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega maintain control of their countries and their security forces.
In Venezuela, everyone—including top civilian allies and military commanders—watched Maduro lose the election and then inelegantly steal it in a desperate attempt to hold onto power. The fact he could steal the vote shows he is still in control. But the fact he lost the vote by such a large margin, including in neighborhoods that were previously government strongholds, places the regime on much shakier ground today than it was a year ago. Maduro could see lashing out at a foreign enemy as a way to regain legitimacy and distract from domestic problems.
Second, Guyana has elections coming up in 2025. With strong economic growth driven by revenues from newly developed oil reserves, President Irfaan Ali is the favorite to win reelection. However, in an anti-incumbent moment when so many democratic leaders are losing, taking Ali’s reelection for granted would be a mistake. Furthermore, the main criticisms of Ali revolve around the licensing contracts the country signed with oil companies and whether Guyana is getting the best deal possible. Maduro may see an advantage in striking should the election provoke political divisions in Guyana. Alternatively, Ali may try to ramp up tensions on the border as a way to remind voters how important it is for Guyana to remain united in an election year. In such circumstances, bellicose rhetoric and posturing could cause the situation to spiral, even if neither side actually wants a war.
Third, there are questions about whether the administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump will maintain the same commitments to Guyana’s territorial integrity as the Biden administration. The expectation is that it will, especially with a Venezuela hawk like Sen. Marco Rubio, the secretary of state-nominee, poised to manage the administration’s Latin America policy. However, other advisers have advocated focusing attention—and perhaps military operations—on Mexico, and the Wall Street Journal has reported that various Trump advisers are calling for negotiations with Caracas. Maduro may test Trump’s commitment to Guyana if the Venezuelan president feels the U.S. is pulling back from the hemisphere or if he believes Trump is willing to trade deals on oil and migrants in exchange for going easy on the dictatorship in Caracas.
War remains unlikely, and any war would be a disaster for Maduro. But with the region in flux, mistakes could easily reignite the conflict and put the issue back on the agenda in 2025, despite the past months of silence. In Latin America, interstate war rarely occurs, but that should not be taken for granted. Therefore, the region should continue pushing de-escalation and directing strong messages at Caracas underscoring just how bad the consequences of a military offensive would be.
James Bosworth is the founder of Hxagon, a firm that does political risk analysis and bespoke research in emerging and frontier markets, as well as a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Latin America Program. He has two decades of experience analyzing politics, economics and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The post Latin America Can’t Let Its Guard Down on Venezuela-Guyana Tensions appeared first on World Politics Review.
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Publish date : 2024-12-09 01:32:00
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